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Agent-Based Negotiation in Uncertain
Environments
John Debenham and Carles Sierra
Abstract An agent aims to secure his projected needs by attempting to build a set of
(business) relationships with other agents. A relationship is built by exchanging pri-
vate information, and is characterised by its intimacy — degree of closeness — and
balance — degree of fairness. Each argumentative interaction between two agents
then has two goals: to satisfy some immediate need, and to do so in a way that
develops the relationship in a desired direction. An agent’s desire to develop each
relationship in a particular way then places constraints on the argumentative utter-
ances. The form of negotiation described is argumentative interaction constrained
by a desire to develop such relationships.
1 Introduction
This paper is in the area labelled: information-based agency [10]. An information-
based agent has an identity, values, needs, plans and strategies all of which are ex-
pressed using a fixed ontology in probabilistic logic for internal representation and
in an illocutionary language [9] for communication. All of the forgoing is repre-
sented in the agent’s deliberative machinery. We assume that such an agent resides
in a electronic institution [1] and is aware of the prevailing norms and interaction
protocols.
[9] describes a rhetorical argumentation framework that supports argumentative
negotiation. It does this by taking into account: the relative information gain of a
new utterance, the relative semantic distance between an utterance and the dialogue
history. Then [11] considered the affect that argumentative dialogue has on the on-
going relationship between a pair of negotiating agents. Neither of these contribu-
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tions addressed the relationship between argumentative utterances or strategies for
argumentation.
This paper is based in rhetorical argumentation [8] — we attempt to edge our
approach towards classical argumentation by modelling the criteria that the part-
ner uses to gauge the effect of argumentation. For example, suppose I am shopping
for a new car and have cited “suitability for a family” as a criterion. The salesman
says “This LandMonster is great value.”, and I reply “My grandmother could not
climb into that.” Classical argumentation may attempt to refute the matriarch’s lack
of gymnastic prowess or the car’s inaccessibility. Taking a less confrontational and
more constructively persuasive view we might note that this statement impacts neg-
atively on the “suitability for a family” criterion, and attempt to counter that impact
possibly with “Its been voted No 1 for children.”. Although a smarter response may
look for an argument that is semantically closer: “The car’s height ensures a very
comfortable ride over rough terrain that is popular with old people.”
Our argumentation agent has to perform two key functions: to understand incom-
ing utterances and to generate responses. In Section 2 we describe the communica-
tion model and an argumentation language that admits Prolog-like statements. The
approach is founded on a model of contract acceptance that is described in Section 3.
Section 4 details a scenario that provides the context for the discussion. Sections 5
and 6 consider the scenario from each side of the bargaining table. Reactive and
proactive argumentation strategies are given in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Communication Model
This paper is written from the point of view of an agent α that is engaged in argu-
mentative interaction with agent β . The history of all argumentative exchanges is
the agents’ relationship. We assume that their utterances, u, can be organised into
distinct dialogues,Ψ t . For simplicity we assume that at most one dialogue exists at
any time. We assume that α and β are negotiating with the mutual aim of signing
a contract, where the contract will be an instantiation of the mutually-understood
object o(Ψ t). We assume that this negotiation is taking place through the exchange
of proposals accompanied by argumentative dialogue.
In order to define a language to structure agent dialogues we need an ontology
that includes a (minimum) repertoire of elements: a set of concepts organised in a
is-a hierarchy (e.g. platypus is a mammal, Australian-dollar is a currency), and a set
of relations over these concepts (e.g. price(beer,AUD) [4]:
An ontology is a tuple O = (V,R,≤,σ) where:
1. V is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic data types), i.e. a vocabulary;
2. R is a finite set of relation symbols;
3. ≤ is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation on V (a partial order), and
4. σ : R→V+ is the function assigning to each relation symbol its arity
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where≤ is the traditional is-a hierarchy. To simplify computations in the computing
of probability distributions we will assume that there is a number of disjoint is-a
trees covering different ontological spaces (e.g. a tree for types of fabric, a tree for
shapes of clothing, and so on). R contains relations between the concepts in the
hierarchy, this is needed to define deals as tuples of issues. Semantic distance plays
a fundamental role in strategies for information-based agency, see [10] for details.
The general argumentation language described here was first reported in [11].
The discussion is from the point of view of an information-based agent α in a
multiagent system where α interacts with negotiating agents, βi, and information
providing agents, θ j: {α,β1, . . . ,βo,θ1, . . . ,θt}.
The shape of the language that α uses to represent the information received and
the content of its dialogues depends on two fundamental actions: (i) passing in-
formation, and (ii) exchanging proposals and contracts. A contract (a,b) between
agents α and β is a pair where a and b represent the actions that agents α and β are
responsible for respectively. Contracts signed by agents and information passed by
agents, are similar to norms in the sense that they oblige agents to behave in a par-
ticular way, so as to satisfy the conditions of the contract, or to make the world con-
sistent with the information passed. Contracts and Information can thus be thought
of as normative statements that restrict an agent’s behaviour.
α’s communication language has two fundamental primitives: Commit(α,β ,ϕ)
to represent, in ϕ , the world that α aims at bringing about and that β has the right to
verify, complain about or claim compensation for any deviations from, and Done(u)
to represent the event that a certain action u1 has taken place. In this way, norms,
contracts, and information chunks will be represented as instances of Commit(·)
where α and β are individual agents. LanguageL is the set of utterances u defined
as:
u ::= illoc(α,β ,ϕ, t) | u;u | Let context InuEnd
ϕ ::=term | Done(u) | Commit(α,β ,ϕ) | ϕ ∧ϕ |
ϕ ∨ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∀x.ϕx | ∃x.ϕx
context ::= ϕ | id = ϕ | prolog clause | context;context
where ϕx is a formula with free variable x, illoc is any appropriate set of illocution-
ary particles, ‘;’ means sequencing, and context represents either previous agree-
ments, previous illocutions, the ontological working context, that is a projection of
the ontological trees that represent the focus of the conversation, or code that aligns
the ontological differences between the speakers needed to interpret an (illocution-
ary) action u. Representing an ontology as a set predicates in Prolog is simple. The
set term contains instances of the ontology concepts and relations.2
1 Without loss of generality we will assume that all actions are dialogical.
2 We assume the convention that V (v) means that v is an instance of concept V and r(v1, . . . ,vn)
implicitly determines that vi is an instance of the concept in the i-th position of the relation r.
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3 Contract Acceptance
No matter what interaction strategy an agent uses, and no matter whether the com-
munication language is that of simple bargaining or rich argumentation, a negoti-
ation agent will have to decide whether or not to sign each contract on the table.
We will argue in Section 5 that the buyer will be uncertain of his preferences in
our Scenario described in Section 4. If an agent’s preferences are uncertain then it
may not make sense to link the agent’s criterion for contract acceptance to a strat-
egy that aims to optimise its utility. Instead, we pose the more general question:
“how certain am I that δ = (φ ,ϕ) is a good contract to sign?” — under realistic
conditions this may be easy to estimate. Pt(sign(α,β ,χ,δ )) estimates the certainty,
expressed as a probability, that α should sign3 proposal δ in satisfaction of her
need χ , where in (φ ,ϕ) φ is α’s commitment and ϕ is β ’s. α will accept δ if:
Pt(sign(α,β ,χ,δ ))> c, for some level of certainty c.
To estimate Pt(sign(α,β ,χ,δ )), α will be concerned about what will occur if
contract δ is signed. If agent α receives a commitment from β , α will be interested
in any variation between β ’s commitment, ϕ , and what is actually observed, as the
enactment, ϕ ′. We denote the relationship between commitment and enactment:
Pt(Observe(α,ϕ ′)|Commit(β ,α,ϕ))
simply as Pt(ϕ ′|ϕ) ∈M t , and now α has to estimate her belief in the acceptability
of each possible outcome δ ′ = (φ ′,ϕ ′). Let Pt(acc(α,χ,δ ′)) denote α’s estimate of
her belief that the outcome δ ′ will be acceptable in satisfaction of her need χ , then
we have:
Pt(sign(α,β ,χ,δ )) = f (Pt(δ ′|δ ),Pt(acc(α,χ,δ ′))) (1)
for some function f ;4 if f is the arithmetic product then this expression is mathemat-
ical expectation. f may be more sensitive; for example, it may be defined to ensure
that no contract is signed if there is a significant probability for a catastrophic out-
come.
There is no prescriptive way in which α should define Pt(acc(α,χ,δ ′)), it is a
matter for applied artificial intelligence to capture the essence of what matters in
the application. In any real application the following three components at least will
be required. Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ ′)) represents α’s belief that enactment δ ′ will satisfy
her need χ . Pt(obj(δ ′)) represents α’s belief that δ ′ is a fair deal against the open
marketplace — it represents α’s objective valuation. Pt(sub(α,χ,δ ′)) represents
α’s belief that δ ′ is acceptable in her own terms taking account of her ability to meet
her commitment φ [9] [10], and any way in which δ ′ has value to her personally5
— it represents α’s subjective valuation. That is:
3 A richer formulation is Pt(eval(α,β ,χ,δ ) = ei) where eval(·) is a function whose range is some
descriptive evaluation space containing terms such as “unattractive in the long term”.
4 β influences the equation in the sense that different β s yield different Pt(δ ′|δ ).
5 For example, when buying a new digital camera, α may give a high subjective valuation to a
camera that uses the same memory cards as her existing camera.
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Pt(acc(α,χ,δ ′)) = g(Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ ′)),Pt(obj(δ ′)),Pt(sub(α,χ,δ ′))) (2)
for some function g.
Suppose that an agent is able to estimate: Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ ′)), Pt(obj(δ ′)) and
Pt(sub(α,χ,δ ′)). The specification of the aggregating g function will then be a
strictly subjective decision. A highly cautious agent may choose to define:
Pt(acc(α,χ,δ ′)) =

1 if: Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ ′))> η1
∧ Pt(obj(δ ′))> η2 ∧ Pt(sub(α,χ,δ ′))> η3
0 otherwise.
for some threshold constants ηi. Whereas an agent that was prepared to permit some
propagation of confidence from one factor to compensate another could define:
Pt(acc(α,χ,δ ′)) = Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ ′))η1 ×Pt(obj(δ ′))η2 ×Pt(sub(α,χ,δ ′))η3
where the ηi balance the influence of each factor.
The point of this is: if an agent aims to produce persuasive argumentative dia-
logue then in the absence of any specific information concerning the structure of g
the agent should ignore g and concentrate on the three categories: Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ ′)),
Pt(obj(δ ′)) and Pt(sub(α,χ,δ ′)).
So how then will α specify: Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ )), Pt(sub(α,χ,δ )) and Pt(obj(δ ))?
Of these three factors only Pt(obj(δ )) has a clear meaning, but it may only be esti-
mated if there is sufficient market data available. In the case of selling sardines this
may well be so, but in the case of Google launching a take-over bid for Microsoft
it will not6. Concerning Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ )) and Pt(sub(α,χ,δ )) we assume that
an agent will somehow assess each of these as some combination of the confidence
levels across a set of privately-known criteria. For example, if I am buying a camera
then I may be prepared to define:
Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ )) = h(Pt(easy-to-use(α,δ )),Pt(well-built(α,δ ))) (3)
for some function h. Any attempt to model another agent’s h function will be as
difficult as modelling g above. But, it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that by
observing my argumentative dialogue an agent could form a view as to which of
these two criteria above was more important.
This paper considers how an agent may observe the argumentative dialogue with
the aim of modelling, within each of the three basic factors, the partner’s criteria and
the relative importance of those criteria. In repeated dealings between two agents,
this model may be strengthened when the objects of the successive negotiations are
semantically close but not necessarily identical.
6 In this example the subjective valuation will be highly complex.
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4 The Scenario
Rhetorical argumentation is freed from the rigour of classical argumentation and
descriptions of it can take the form of “this is how it works here” and “this is how it
works there” without describing a formal basis. We attempt to improve on this level
of vagary by using a general scenario and describing the behaviour of our agents
within it.
In a general retail scenario there is a seller agent, α , and a buyer, β . The items
for sale are abstracted from: digital cameras, mobile phones, PDAs, smart video
recorders, computer software, sewing machines and kitchen mixers. The features
of an item are those that are typically listed on the last few pages of an instruction
booklet. For example, a camera’s features could include the various shutter speeds
that it is capable of, the various aperture settings, the number of years of warranty,
and so on — together the features describe the capabilities of the item. For the
purpose of comparison with other items, β will consider a particular item as a typed
Boolean vector over the (possible) features of each item available, this vector shows
which feature is present. The state of an item is then specified by identifying which
of the item’s features are ‘on’. For example, the state of a camera could be: ‘ready’
with aperture set to ‘f8’ and shutter speed set to ‘1 500’th of a second’. In this
scenario an offer is a pair (supply of a particular item, supply of some money) being
α’s and β ’s commitments respectively.
β may wish to know how well an item performs certain tasks. Software agents
are not naturally endowed with the range of sensory and motor functions to enable
such an evaluation. We imagine that the seller agent has an associated tame human
who will demonstrate how the various items perform particular tasks on request, but
performs no other function. We also imagine that the buyer agent has an associated
tame human who can observe what is demonstrated, articulates an evaluation of it
that is passed to its own agent, but performs no other function.
To simplify our set up we assume that the seller, α , is β ’s only source of infor-
mation about what tasks each item can perform, and, as we describe below, what
sequence of actions are necessary to make an item perform certain tasks7. That is,
our multiagent system consists only of {α,β}, and the buyer is denied access to
product reviews, but does have access to market pricing data. This restriction sim-
plifies the interactions and focusses the discussion on the argumentation.
For example, if the item is a camera the buyer may wish to observe how to set
the camera’s states so that it may be used for ‘point-and-shoot’ photography. If the
item is a sewing machine she may wish to see how to make a button hole on a piece
of cloth. If the item is graphics software she may wish to see how to draw a polygon
with a two-pixel red line and to colour the polygon’s interior blue. These tasks will
be achieved by enacting a process that causes the item to pass though a sequence of
states that will be explained to β by α . So far our model consists of: features, states,
sequences and tasks.
7 In other words, the sort of information that is normally available in the item’s Instruction Booklet
— we assume that α conveys this information accurately.
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We assume that the object of the negotiation is clear where the object is an unin-
stantiated statement of what both agents jointly understand as the intended outcome
— e.g. I wish to exchange a quantity of eggs of certain quality for cash. We assume
that each agent is negotiating with the aim of satisfying some goal or need that is
private knowledge. In determining whether a negotiation outcome is acceptable in
satisfaction of a need we assume that an agent will blend the factors in our accep-
tance model described in Section 3. We assume that for each factor an agent will
articulate a set of criteria that together determine whether the factor is acceptable.
The criteria may include private information such as deadlines.
More formally, there is a set of feature names, F , a set of item names, I , a
feature mapping: feature :I →×n(B :F )where there are n feature names, andB is
a boolean variable that may be> or⊥. Each item name belongs to a unique concept
— e.g.: “Nikon123 is-a camera”. For any particular item name, ν , feature(ν) will
be a typed Boolean vector indicating which features that item ν possesses. Let Fν
be the set of nν features that item ν possesses. At any particular time t, the state
of an item is a mapping: statet : I → ×nν (B : Fν) where the value > denotes
that the corresponding feature of that item is ‘on’. A sequence is an ordered set
of states, (wi), where successive states differ in one feature only being on and off.
A sequence is normally seen as performing a task that are linked by the mapping:
to-do :T → 2S where T is the set of tasks andS the set of all possible sequences
— that is, there many be several sequences that perform a task. If a sequence is
performed on an item then, with the assistance of a human, the agent rates how well
it believes the sequence performs the associated task. The evaluation space, E , could
be {good, OK, bad}. A criterion is a predicate: criterion(ν), meaning that the item
ν satisfies criterion ‘criterion’. The set of criteria is C .
5 The Buyer Assesses A Contract
In this Section we consider how the buyer might use the general framework in Sec-
tion 3 to assess a contract8. In general an agent will be concerned about the enact-
ment of any contract signed as described in Equation 1. In the scenario described
in Section 4, enactment is not an issue, and so we focus on Equation 2. To simplify
things we ignore the subjective valuation factor. Before addressing the remaining
two factors we note that the buyer will not necessarily be preference aware.
First β must give meaning to Pt(satisfy(β ,χ,δ )) by defining suitable criteria and
the way that the belief should be aggregated across those criteria. Suppose one of
β ’s criteria is Pt(ease-of-use(β ,δ )). The idea is that β will ask α to demonstrate
how certain tasks are performed, will observe the sequences that α performs, and
will use those observations to revise this probability distribution until some clear
verdict appears.
8 The seller will have little difficulty in deciding whether a contract is acceptable if he knows what
the items cost.
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Suppose the information acquisition process is managed by a plan pi . Let ran-
dom variable X represent Pt(ease-of-use(β ,δ ) = ei) where the ei are values from
an evaluation space that could be E ={fantastic, acceptable, just OK, shocking}.
Then given a sequence s that was supposed to achieve task τ , suppose that β ’s tame
human rates s as evidence for ease-of-use as e ∈ E with probability z. Suppose that
β attaches a weighting Rt(pi,τ,s) to s, 0 < R < 1, which is β ’s estimate of the
significance of the observation of sequence s within plan pi as an indicator of the
true value of X . For example, the on the basis of the observation alone β might
rate ease-of-use as e = acceptable with probability z = 0.8, and separately give a
weighting of Rt(pi,τ,s) = 0.9 to the sequence s as an indicator of ease-of-use. For
an information-based agent each plan pi has associated update functions, Jpi(·), such
that JXpi (s) is a set of linear constraints on the posterior distribution for X . In this
example, the posterior value of ‘acceptable’ would simply be constrained to 0.8.
Denote the prior distribution Pt(X) by p, and let p(s) be the distribution with




fies the constraints JXs (s). Then let q(s) be the distribution:




q(s) if q(s) is more interesting than p
p otherwise
(5)
A general measure of whether q(s) is more interesting than p is: K(q(s)‖D(X)) >
K(p‖D(X)), where K(x‖y) = ∑ j x j log x jy j is the Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distributions x and y, and D(X) is the expected distribution in the
absence of any observations — D(X) could be the maximum entropy distribution.
Finally, Pt+1(X) = Pt(X(s)). This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two
probabilities: first, the probability z in the rating of the sequence s that was intended
to achieve τ , and second β ’s weighting Rt(pi,τ,s) of the significance of τ as an
indicator of the true value of X . Equation 5 is intended to prevent weak information
from decreasing the certainty of Pt+1(X). For example if the current distribution
is (0.1,0.7,0.1,0.1), indicating an “acceptable” rating, then weak evidence P(X =
acceptable) = 0.25 is discarded.
Equation 4 simply adds in new evidence p(s) to p weighted with Rt(pi,τ,s). This
is fairly crude, but the observations are unlikely to be independent and the idea is
9 Given a probability distribution q, the minimum relative entropy distribution p = (p1, . . . , pI)
subject to a set of J linear constraints g= {g j(p) = aj ·p− c j = 0}, j = 1, . . . ,J (that must include
the constraint∑i pi−1= 0) is: p= argminr∑ j r j log r jq j . This may be calculated by introducing La-
grange multipliers λ : L(p,λ ) =∑ j p j log
p j
q j
+λ ·g. Minimising L, { ∂L∂λ j = g j(p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . ,J
is the set of given constraints g, and a solution to ∂L∂ pi = 0, i= 1, . . . , I leads eventually to p. Entropy-
based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is convenient when the data is sparse [2] and
encapsulates common-sense reasoning [7].
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that pi will specify a “fairly comprehensive” set of tasks aimed to determine Pt(X)
to a level of certainty sufficient for Equation 2.
Pt(obj(δ )) estimates the belief that δ is acceptable in the open-market that β
may observe in the scenario. Information-based agents model what they don’t know
with certainty as probability distributions. Suppose that X is a discrete random vari-
able whose true value is the open-market value of an item. First, β should be able
to bound X to an interval (xmin,xmax) — if this is all the evidence that β can muster
then X will be the flat distribution (with maximum entropy) in this interval, and
Pt(obj((item,y)) = ∑x≥yP(X = x). β may observe evidence, perhaps as observed
sale prices for similar items, that enables him to revise particular values in the dis-
tribution for X . A method [9] similar to that described above is used to derive the
posterior distribution — it is not detailed here. An interesting aspect of this approach
is that it works equally well when the valuation space has more than one dimension.
6 The Seller Models the Buyer
In this Section we consider how the seller might model the buyer’s contract accep-
tance logic in an argumentative context. As in Section 5 we focus on Equation 2 and
for reasons of economy concentrate on the factor: Pt(satisfy(α,χ,δ )).
Suppose that β has found an item that he wants to buy, α will be interested in
how much he is prepared to pay. In a similar way to Section 5, α can interpret β ’s
proposals as willingness to accept the offers proposed, and counter-offers as reluc-
tance to accept the agent’s prior offer — all of these interpretations being qualified
with an epistemic belief probability. Entropy-based inference is then used to derive a
complete probability distribution over the space of offers for a random variable that
represents the partner’s limit offers. This distribution is “the least biased estimate
possible on the given information; i.e. it is maximally noncommittal with regard to
missing information” [3]. If there are n-issues then the space of limit offers will be
an (n−1)-dimensional surface through offer space.
α’s world model, M t , contains probability distributions that model the agent’s
belief in the world, including the state of β . In particular, for every criterion c ∈ C
α associates a random variable C with probability mass function Pt(C = ei).
The distributions that relate object to criteria may be learned from prior experi-
ence. If Pt(C = e|O = o) is the prior distribution for criteria C over an evaluation
space given that the object is o, then given evidence from a completed negotiation
with object o we use the standard update procedure described in Section 5. For
example, given evidence that α believes with probability p that C = ei in a negoti-
ation with object o then Pt+1(C = e|O = o) is the result of applying the constraint
P(C = ei|O = o) = p with minimum relative entropy inference as described previ-
ously, where the result of the process is protected by Equation 5 to ensure that weak
evidence does not override prior estimates.
In the absence of evidence of the form described above, the distributions, Pt(C =
e|O = o), should gradually tend to ignorance. If a decay-limit distribution [9] is
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known they should tend to it otherwise they should tend to the maximum entropy
distribution.
In a multiagent system, this approach can be strengthened in repeated negotia-
tions by including the agent’s identity, Pt(C = e|(O= o,Agent = β )) and exploiting
a similarity measure across the ontology. So if β purchased a kitchen mixer appar-
ently with the criterion “easy to carry” then that would increase the prior probability
that β will use the criterion “easy to carry” in negotiating for a sewing machine.
Two methods for propagating estimates across the world model by exploiting the
Sim(·) measure are described in [9]. An extension of the Sim(·) measure to sets of
concepts is straightforward, we will note it as Sim∗(·).
Agent β ’s disposition is the underlying rationale that he has for a dialogue. α will
be concerned with the confidence in α’s beliefs of β ’s disposition as this will affect
the certainty with which α believes she knows β ’s key criteria. Gauging disposition
in human discourse is not easy, but is certainly not impossible. We form expectations
about what will be said next; when those expectations are challenged we may well
believe that there is a shift in the rationale.
The bargaining literature consistently advises (see for example [5]) that an agent
should change its stance (one dimension of stance being the ‘nice guy’ / ‘tough guy’
axis) to prevent other agents from decrypting their private information, and so we
should expect some sort of “smoke screen” surrounding any dialogue between com-
petitive agents. It would be convenient to think of disposition as the mirror-image
of stance, but what matters is the agent’s confidence in its model of the partner. The
problem is to differentiate between a partner that is skilfully preventing us from de-
crypting their private information, and a partner that has either had a fundamental
change of heart or has changed his mind in a way that will significantly influence
the set of contracts that he will agree to. The first of these is normal behaviour, and
the second means that the models of the partner may well be inaccurate.
α’s model of β ’s disposition is DC = Pt(C = e|O = o) for every criterion in the
ontology, where o is the object of the negotiation. α’s confidence in β ’s disposition
is the confidence he has in these distributions. Given a negotiation object o, confi-
dence will be aggregated from H(C = e|O = o) for every criterion in the ontology.
Then the idea is that if in the negotiation for a camera “for family use” α is asked to
demonstrate how to photograph a drop of water falling from a tap then this would
presumably cause a dramatic difference between Pt(C = e|(O = “family use”))
and Pt(C= e|(O= “family use”,O′= “photograph water drops”)). This difference
causes α to revise her belief in “family use”, to revise the disposition towards dis-
tributions of higher entropy, and to approach the negotiation on a broader basis.
7 Strategies
In this section we describe the components of an argumentation strategy starting
with tools for valuing information revelation that are used to model the fairness of a
negotiation dialogue.
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Everything that an agent communicates gives away information. The simple offer
“you may purchase this wine for e3” may be intrepretd in a utilitarian sense (e.g.
the profit that you could make by purchasing it), and as information (in terms of
the reduction of your entropy or uncertainty in your beliefs about my limit price for
the item). Information-based agents value information exchanged, and attempt to
manage the associated costs and benefits.
Illocutionary categories and an ontology together form a framework in which
the value of information exchanged can be categorised. The LOGIC framework for
argumentative negotiation [11] is based on five illocutionary categories: Legitimacy
of the arguments, Options i.e. deals that are acceptable, Goals i.e. motivation for
the negotiation, Independence i.e: outside options, and Commitments that the agent
has including its assets. In general, α has a set of illocutionary categories Y and a
categorising function κ :L →P(Y ). The power set,P(Y ), is required as some
utterances belong to multiple categories. For example, in the LOGIC framework the
utterance “I will not pay more for a bottle of Beaujolais than the price that John
charges” is categorised as both Option (what I will accept) and Independence (what
I will do if this negotiation fails).
Then two central concepts describe relationships and dialogues between a pair
of agents. These are intimacy — degree of closeness, and balance — degree of
fairness. In this general model, the intimacy of α’s relationship with β , At , measures
the amount that α knows about β ’s private information and is represented as real
numeric values over G = Y ×V .
Suppose α receives utterance u from β and that category y ∈ κ(u). For any con-
cept x ∈ V , define ∆(u,x) = maxx′∈concepts(u)Sim(x′,x). Denote the value of Ati in
position (y,x) by At(y,x) then:
At(y,x) = ρ×At−1(y,x)+(1−ρ)× I(u)×∆(u,x)
for any x, where ρ is the discount rate, and I(u) is the information10 in u. The
balance of α’s relationship with βi, Bt , is the element by element numeric difference
of At and α’s estimate of β ’s intimacy on α .
We are particularly interested in the concept of intimacy in so far as it estimates
what α knows about β ’s criteria, and about the certainty of α’s estimates of the
random variables {Ci}. We are interested in balance as a measure of the ‘fairness’
of the dialogue. If α shows β how to take a perfect photograph of a duck then it is
reasonable to expect some information at least in return.
Moreover, α acts proactively to satisfy her needs — that are organised in a hierar-
chy11 of needs, Ξ , and a function ω : Ξ →P(W ) where W is the set of perceivable
states, and ω(χ) is the set of states that satisfy need χ ∈ Ξ . Needs turn ‘on’ spon-
taneously, and in response to triggers. They turn ‘off’ because α believes they are
10 Information is measured in the Shannon sense, if at time t, α receives an utterance u that may
alter this world model then the (Shannon) information in u with respect to the distributions inM t
is: I(u) =H(M t)−H(M t+1).
11 In the sense of the well-known Maslow hierarchy [6], where the satisfaction of needs that are
lower in the hierarchy take precedence over the satisfaction of needs that are higher.
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satisfied. When a need fires, a plan is chosen to satisfy that need (we do not describe
plans here). If α is to contemplate the future she will need some idea of her future
needs — this is represented in her needs model: υ : T →×|Ξ |[0,1] where T is time,
and: υ(t) = (χ t1, . . . ,χ
t
|Ξ |) where χ
t
i = P(need χi fires at time t).
Given the needs model, υ , α’s relationship model (Relate(·)) determines the tar-
get intimacy, A∗ti , and target balance, B
∗t
i , for each agent i in the known set of agents
Agents. That is, {(A∗ti ,Bt∗i)}|Agents|i=1 =Relate(υ ,X,Y,Z)where, Xi is the trust model,
Yi is the honour model and Zi is the reliability model as described in [9]. As noted
before, the values for intimacy and balance are not simple numbers but are struc-
tured sets of values over Y ×V .
When a need fires α first selects an agent βi to negotiate with — the so-
cial model of trust, honour and reliability provide input to this decision, i.e. βi =
Select(χ,X,Y,Z). We assume that in her social model, α has medium-term inten-
tions for the state of the relationship that she desires with each of the available
agents — these intentions are represented as the target intimacy, A∗ti , and target bal-
ance, B∗ti , for each agent βi. These medium-term intentions are then distilled into
short-term targets for the intimacy, A∗∗ti , and balance, B
∗∗t
i , to be achieved in the
current dialogue Ψ t , i.e. (A∗∗ti ,B∗∗ti ) = Set(χ,A∗ti ,B∗ti ). In particular, if the balance
target, B∗∗ti , is grossly exceeded by β failing to co-operate then it becomes a trigger
for α to terminate the negotiation.
For an information-based agent, an incoming utterance is only of interest if it
reduces the uncertainty (entropy) of the world model in some way. In information-
based argumentation we are particularly interested in the effect that an argumenta-
tive utterance has in the world model including β ’s disposition, and α’s estimate of
β ’s assessment of current proposals in terms of its criteria.
Information-based argumentation attempts to counter the effect of the partner’s
arguments, in the simple negotiation protocol used here, an argumentative utterance,
u, will either contain a justification of the proposal it accompanies, a rating and
justification of one of α demonstration sequences, or a counter-justification of one
of α’s prior proposals or arguments. If u requests α to perform a task then u may
modify β ’s disposition i.e. the set of conditional estimates of the form: Pt(C= e|O=
o)). If β rates and comments on the demonstration of a sequence then this affects
α’s estimate of β ’s likelihood to accept a contract as described in Equation 1 (this
is concerned with how β will apply his criteria).
Suppose that u rates and comments on the performance of a sequence then that
sequence will have been demonstrated in response to a request to perform a task.
Given a task, τ , and a object, s, α may have estimates for Pt(C = e|(O= o,T = τ))
— if so then this suggests a link between the task and a set of one or more crite-
ria Cu. The effect that u has on β ’s criteria (what ever they are) will be conveyed
as the rating. In the spirit of the scenario, we assume that for every criterion and
object pair (C,o) α has a supply of positive argumentative statements L(C,o). Sup-
pose α wishes to counter the negatively rated u with a positively rated u′. Let Ψu
be the set of all arguments exchanged between α and β prior to u in the dialogue.
Let Mu ⊆ L(C,o) for any C ∈ Cµ . Let Nu ⊆ Mu such that ∀x ∈ Nu and ∀u′ ∈Ψu,
Sim∗(concepts(x),concepts(u′)) > η for some constant η . So Nu is a set of argu-
Agent-Based Negotiation in Uncertain Environments
ments all of which (a) have a positive effect on at least one criterion associated with




argminu′∈Nu Sim∗(concepts(u),concepts(u′)) if Nu 6= /0
argminu′∈Mu Sim∗(concepts(u),concepts(u′)) otherwise.
So using only ‘fresh’ arguments, α prefers to choose a counter argument to u that is
semantically close to u, and if that is not possible she chooses an argument that has
some general positive effect on the criteria and may not have been used previously.
Suppose that u proposes a contract. α will either decide to accept it or to make a
counter offer. We do not describe the bargaining process here, see [9].
8 Discussion
If βi communicates u then α responds with:
u′ = Argue(u,M t ,Ψ t ,A∗∗t ,B∗∗t ,Cu,Nu,Mu,Du))
where:
• the negotiation mechanisms as explained in Section 7 sets parameters A∗∗t ,B∗∗t)
(see e.g. [11] for further details);
• the argumentation process determines the parameters Nu,Mu needed to generate
the accompanying arguments to the proposal, see Section 7;
• the criteria modeling process determines the set of criteria Cu used by our oppo-
nent to assess the proposals, see Section 6; and,
• the disposition modeling sets the distributions Du used to interpret the stance of
the opponent, see Section 6.
We have described an approach to argumentation that aims to:
• discover what the partner’s key evaluative criteria are,
• model how the partner is evaluating his key criteria given some evidence,
• influence the partner’s evaluation of his key criteria,
• influence the relative importance that the partner attaches to those criteria, and
• introduce new key criteria when it is strategic to do so.
The ideas described here are an attempt to develop an approach to argumentation
that may be used in the interests of both parties. It aims to achieve this by unearthing
the ‘top layer’ of the partner’s reasoning apparatus and by attempting to work with
it rather than against it. To this end, the utterances produced aim to influence the
partner to believe what we believe to be in his best interests — although it may not
be in fact. The utterances aim to convey what is so, and not to point out “where
the partner is wrong”. In the long term, this behaviour is intended to lead to the
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development of lasting relationships between agents that are underpinned both by
the knowledge that their partners “treat them well” and that their partners act as they
do “for the right reasons”.
In previous work [11] we have advocated the gradual development of trust and
intimacy12 through successive argumentative exchanges as a way of building rela-
tionships between agents. In this paper we have gone one step further by including
a modest degree of understanding in the sense that an agent attempts to under-
stand what her partner likes. This augments the tools for building social relation-
ships through argumentation by establishing:
• trust — my belief in the veracity of your commitments
• intimacy — my belief in the extent to which I know your private information
• understanding — my belief in the extent to which I know what you like
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